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Zarys treści: Pierwsza wojna światowa wymusiła na elitach Europy Zachodniej potrzebę okreś-
lenia,  czym ma być Europa Wschodnia, jak wyglądać będzie nowy porządek polityczny po 
zakończeniu wielkiej wojny, czy da się utrzymać równowagę między Rosją a Niemcami oraz 
co zrobić z coraz większymi ambicjami Rosji sowieckiej przywrócenia kontroli nad ziemiami 
byłego Imperium Rosyjskiego. Niniejszy tekst dotyczy wizji Europy Wschodniej wśród brytyj-
skich elit politycznych od memoriału Arthura Balfoura z 1916 r. do koncepcji tej części Europy 
stworzonej w kręgu premiera Davida Lloyda George’a w 1920 r. oraz analiz Halforda Mackindera, 
ojca brytyjskiej geopolityki.
Outline of contents: During the Great War elites of Western Europe were forced to decide on 
their perception of Eastern Europe, on a new political order after the end of the war, and 
to think out how to keep the balance between Russia and Germany and what to do with 
increasing ambitions of Soviet Russia to regain control over the territories of the former Russian 
Empire. This text attempts to re-create the specific frame of mind of early twentieth-century 
British political elites which influenced their perception of Eastern European developments 
from Arthur Balfour’s memorial in 1916 to Eastern Europe’s concepts by Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George in 1920 and analyses of Sir Halford Mackinder, the father of British 
geopolitics.
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“British public opinion was ill-informed about European geopolitical realities and 
influenced by assumptions and illusions drawn from Britain’s own unique history. 
Nor was the British public ever much interested in Eastern Europe, whose affairs 
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were assumed to be of little consequence for British security”.1 This observation 
is fair as far as it goes. But it is not enough, if we want to re-create the specific 
frame of mind of early twentieth-century British political elites which influenced 
their perception of Eastern European developments in the turbulent years of the 
Great War and its aftermath. 
Maybe not just one frame, nor just one mind, and maybe not just then. If one 
wishes to grasp the issue of “mental maps” of imperial elites and to understand its 
– possibly only theoretical – paradoxes, it is worth consulting a model constructed 
by a Norwegian political scientist, Ola Tunander. Analysing the geopolitics of 
the post-Cold War situation in Europe, he pointed to two competing structures 
of political imagination.2 One is based on a hierarchical vision of the world as 
a continuum stretching from the Universe (Order, Civilization) to Chaos (Barbaria). 
This model, reminiscent of Enlightenment thinking, assumes there is only one 
order which is of a universal nature and leaves no room for any pluralism in its 
civilization. There is no room for dialogue, only instructions given by the advanced 
to the underdeveloped. This is the model of the West (and the Rest). Within the 
system of Universe-Chaos, stresses Tunander, traditional disputes about territories 
and domination in space lose their importance. New ideas, technologies, capital 
transactions, and decision-making centres tend to become concentrated. How close 
they are to the centre of the new Order is the most important issue. Peripheries, 
crucial for the size of empires, may turn into a burden. The imperial centre may 
even cut off some peripheries, parts of its “sphere of obligation”, which drag it 
towards Chaos.
The world of imperial imagination includes a second model of perceiving 
political and cultural reality, one much more deeply rooted in history. This is the 
“Schmittian” concept based on a fundamental differentiation between Friends and 
Foes. Various civilizational models focused around empires (or helping empires to 
crystallize) compete with one another. Their rivalry extends also to space. Loss of 
a periphery immediately strengthens the other competitor. It is not about expanding 
the “Order” – it is about the approach of the “Enemy”. This is a zero-sum game. 
Exercising control over “strategic” points on the map of rivalry with other players 
is a clear imperative, regardless of the price the imperial centre would have to pay 
for it in economic terms, in order to prevent strategically important parts of the 
Empire from being controlled by rivals. 
When confronted with attempts to put the world scene in order, imperial 
thought searches for answers in its own imperial tradition. It does so by combining 
its “Enlightenment” model, where the Empire formed a part of the common ground 
1  D. Lieven, Towards the Flame. Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia, London, 2015, p. 300.
2  O. Tunander, “Post-Cold War Europe: A Synthesis of a Bipolar Friend-Foe Structure and a Hier-
archic Cosmos-Chaos Structure?”, in: Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe, eds. O. Tunander, P. Baev 
and V.I. Einagel, London, 1997, pp. 17–44. See my development of this model in: A. Nowak, 
History and Geopolitics: A Contest for Eastern Europe, Warsaw, 2008, pp. 201–233.
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of one Civilization and Order and justified its mission of expansion and exercising 
control over huge areas from Central Europe to the Pacific Ocean with the model 
of “warring civilizations”, that is by combining the “Universe-Chaos” model with 
the “Enemy-Friend” one. Or it can stay with one of these models and set of answers 
it gives for a particular geopolitical challenge. Selecting the right answer proved 
to be the most difficult with regard to a Europe where the Centre meets the East, 
referred to by some people as Central, by others as Eastern or Central and Eastern 
Europe. This cross-border region between “the West”, the axis of the modern 
“Order”, its German self-proclaimed representatives, and its eastern, Euro-Asiatic, 
Russian imperial neighbour, principal rivals in the “Enemy-Friend” model – was 
actually the least known and the least interesting from the British point of view. 
In 1914 the only imagined British interest in Eastern Europe was stability. 
Herbert Asquith’s liberal government entered the Great War with no intention of 
redrawing the political map of continental Europe. The British statesmen neither 
intended to break any empires nor to “make” any nations there. Quite the contrary, 
they wanted to save the Continent from any geopolitical revolution. The three 
Eastern European empires – Romanov Russia, Habsburg Austria-Hungary, and 
the Hohenzollern German Reich – were considered as pillars of the order that 
were to be kept, at least in the vast territories between Germany proper, Russia 
proper, and the Balkans. 
“Germany proper” and “Russia proper” do not comprise, in the British political 
imagination of 1914, any ethnographic entities, but the “just” and “proper” places 
accorded to two co-members of the “imperial concert” on the London elite’s 
mental maps. Russia had a vast potential to become “improper” in Asia, where her 
expansion collided with the interests of the British Empire: from Constantinople 
and the Straits, through the Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan, India, Tibet, all the 
way to China. Germany also had a potential to become “improper”, and to form 
a perceived danger in the British political elites’ eyes. This was firstly because 
of Berlin’s bid to stretch out, through its domination over Vienna, as far as to 
Constantinople, to Turkey, to the Middle East, close to the centre of the British 
Empire. Secondly, it was because of Berlin’s naval ambitions. Finally, a fear of 
a final German victory over France and the consolidation of Berlin’s grip over the 
western half of the Continent was the straw that broke the post-Victorian camel’s 
back. The balance of power in Europe was in danger.
British imperial elites were as ready to use Russia “proper” to balance “improper” 
Germany, as they had been ready to use Germany to balance Russia before and – as 
we shall see – after the 1914 crisis. But the balance itself between Germany and 
Russia in Eastern Europe was believed in London to be fine. So it seemed obvious 
to restore that balance after German “impropriety” elsewhere (in Belgium) had 
been castigated. Russia and Germany (with Austria as an adjunct to Berlin) were 
both seen in London as necessary, principal, and not infrequently even as the only 
partners in keeping a stable order between the Baltic, the Danube, and the Black Sea. 
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Which one of them should be given a larger share of the territories in-between 
was a matter that affected more than just the Eastern European balance of power. 
So – enemies sometimes, but in the longer run important partners in sharing with 
the British, the French, and the Americans their common task of playing Atlas: to 
keep sunny skies over the world against all possible forces of disorder – this could 
be the safest description of the place of Russia and Germany on the mental map 
of the imperial elites in London before the outbreak of the Great War. 
A principle of nationality or, rather, the very existence of political ambitions 
and projects of nationalities other than Russians and Germans in Eastern Europe 
could belong to a list of possible forces of disorder to be tamed, rather than to 
a list of questions to be resolved with the help of the British Empire. The moral 
instincts of the liberal majority of Asquith’s government were expressed in this 
geographical direction in their dislike of Tsarism and hopes for its evolutionary 
dissolution by the rays of general progress – a dissolution brought about by the 
efforts of the Russian people. Nothing else was imagined.
British statesmen were forced to exercise their geographical imagination by 
the sheer magnitude of the consequences of the decision to enter the war against 
Germany. As it happened, war meant entering Eastern Europe, at least since 
Russia had proven to be unable to control that region by herself, and a spectre 
of a German Mitteleuropa began to materialize. This moment came at the end of 
1916, exactly when a new coalition government was formed in London, with David 
Lloyd George as the new prime minister. Even before he would take the Foreign 
Office in the new government, Arthur Balfour, by then the most senior member of 
the British imperial establishment, presented a memorandum entitled “The Peace 
Settlement in Europe”, signed on 4 October 1916, and prepared at the request of 
the prime minister. The memorandum offers the most instructive insight into the 
place which Eastern Europe, and its crucial political problem – Poland – occupied 
in the British imperial mind burdened with the Great War. 
Balfour, who had himself been prime minister between 1902 and 1905, when 
he had been the architect of the 1904 Entente cordiale with France, had been 
already present at the creation of a peace settlement along with Lord Salisbury 
and Disraeli – as far back as at the Berlin Congress in 1878. He knew that the 
principal object of a war is the attainment of a durable peace. The logic of the 
Friend-Foe model operated in his concept of a post-Great War peace against 
Germany and Austria. So Balfour suggested that “the area from which the Central 
Powers can draw the men and money required for a policy of aggression”3 should 
be diminished. As a consequence, ethnographically Polish territories of Germany 
and Austria should be detached from the inimical powers. But where should 
they go? The Cosmos-Chaos model was even more important to Balfour – and 
3  A. Balfour, The Peace Settlement in Europe, quoted after: D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, London, 
vol. 1 [1933], p. 524.
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from this perspective “what we rather vaguely call ‘the principle of nationality’” 
was considered both a chance and a danger. At least when applied to a nation 
(or any group of nations) between the two established (or re-established, as 
was hoped, after the War) pillars of Eastern European order – that is Germany 
and Russia.
Balfour introduced “the Polish question” in his October 1916 memorandum, 
beginning with “a purely British point of view”, that is with the Friend-Foe, “real-
istic” perspective. “The Foe” at that moment was Germany, as well as its ally – 
Austria-Hungary. So in order to make the Central Powers weaker and less capable 
of any further aggression, Balfour suggested that it would have been necessary to 
detach from them “as much of Austrian and German Poland as possible”, and 
to unite these territories with “Russian Poland”, that is with the westernmost 
part of the Tsarist share of the prepartitioned Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 
However, Lord Arthur added an important caveat to this suggestion: “But I should 
not like to see the old Kingdom of Poland restored. I should fear that the new 
Poland would suffer from the diseases through which the old Poland perished; 
that it would be a theatre of perpetual intrigues between Germany and Russia; 
and that its existence, so far from promoting the cause of European peace, would 
be a perpetual occasion of European strife. Moreover, even if such Poland were 
capable of playing the part of an efficient buffer State (which I doubt), I am not 
sure that a buffer State between Germany and Russia would be any advantage to 
Western Europe. If Germany were relieved of all fear of pressure from Russia, 
and were at liberty to turn her whole strength towards developing her western 
ambitions, France and Britain might be the sufferers, and I am by any means 
confident that cutting off Russia from her western neighbours might not divert 
her interests towards the Far East to an extent which Britain statesmen could not 
view without some misgivings. The more Russia is made a European rather than 
an Asiatic Power, the better for everybody”.4
Balfour introduces first a possible role for “lesser” Eastern European nationali-
ties (such as Poles) as potentially useful instruments against contemporary enemies: 
the Central Powers. He reminds us quickly, however, that from a more universal 
point of view (that of “Western Europe”, and “the cause of European peace”, finally 
– “for everybody”) it is better not to introduce any new political entity between 
Germany and Russia. Maybe the Poles want to have their independent state, but 
it would be better “for everybody”, and for the European balance of power, surely, 
if they did not. Balfour presents his belief (rather typical to a majority, probably, 
of the late Victorian political elite – both in its conservative and liberal branches) 
that he knows better what is good “for everybody”.5 And, moreover, not everyone 
4  Ibid., pp. 525–526.
5  See an interesting analysis of this phenomenon: U. Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire. A Study 
in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought, Chicago (IL), 1999. 
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else knows that. Especially other peoples – those who could endanger peace and 
balance between empires, the “real” players of international politics – are not 
able to speak for themselves. Moreover, they should not have this possibility. 
They always have some “old, bad habits”, or could form a “theatre of perpetual 
intrigues”, which is better to avoid. They do not represent themselves but only 
the danger of Chaos. Order restored is an order between known empires. Balfour 
had prepared a general scheme of such an order before the war, in his letter 
(from 1909) to the president of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt. In this, 
he presented his rather gloomy vision of Western civilization’s decadence and its 
possible end, inundated by alien, non-Western cultures. But he also depicted the 
cure or rather the means to delay that process. It had a form of an Anglo-Saxon 
Confederation, that is, a close alliance between the United States and the British 
Empire, as the basis of the world order. It should be helped in other parts of the 
globe with other confederations (empires): a Russian, a German, a “Latin” (with 
France, Spain, and Italy in its core), and an “Asiatic” one – Japanese or Chinese. 
These are forces of Order – necessary to stop oncoming Chaos.6 
The fact that imperial Russia collapsed four months after Balfour’s October 
1916 memorandum and the Bolsheviks took the power in Petrograd a year later, 
complicated the restoration of that sort of order, at least in Russia and Eastern 
Europe. The Central Powers, still the enemies of the British empire in the war, 
could not have been counted as partners for London (even less so for Paris), at 
least at that moment. Poles, and other nations from the region between Germany 
and Russia, found their chance to (re)enter the political map. I do not intend to 
enumerate here the list of official declarations of the British government which 
followed in 1917 and 1918, along with the famous “Fourteen points” of the newly 
associated power’s leader, President Woodrow Wilson, dealing with the rights of 
nations and prospects of new states in Eastern Europe.7 How were these prospects 
and pledges stemming from an acute, but temporary stage of a Friend-Foe situation 
(separating London from both Berlin and Petersburg/Petrograd – finally “Red” 
Moscow, former traditional guarantors of stability in “faraway” countries of Eastern 
and Central Europe), to be reconciled with a vision of a stable post-war Order, 
taming once again a tide of Chaos? This was the question that bothered British 
statesmen. Their answers, presented at the creation of the Versailles system, are 
of interest to us here. 
6  See M. Egremont, A Life of Arthur James Balfour, London, 1980, pp. 250–251; see also J. Tomes, 
Balfour and Foreign Policy: The International Thought of a Conservative Statesman, Cambridge, 
1997.
7  See, for example, T. Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic: A Study in the Diplomatic History 
of Europe, 1914–1920, London, 1957, pp. 141–222; W. Sukiennicki, East Central Europe during 
World War I: From Foreign Domination to National Independence, ed. M. Siekierski, vol. 2, New 
York and Boulder, 1984; Wilsonian East Central Europe: Current Perspectives, ed. J.S. Micgiel, 
New York, 1995. 
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The new government, with a Conservative majority, but still with the Liberal 
David Lloyd George at the helm, was responsible for preparing the right solutions. 
Lloyd George contemplated, critically at first, an option presented to him by Jan 
Smuts, the South African member of the Imperial War Cabinet. Smuts wanted to 
restore full cooperation with Germany as the best way to recreate stability and peace 
on the Continent. And with independent Poland reaching out for the Prussian part 
of Germany’s territories (Gdańsk/Danzig, Upper Silesia, the Poznań region), he 
deemed such a cooperation with Berlin impossible. So his opinion was clear: if any 
geopolitical changes would be introduced in Eastern Europe, they were to conform 
to the will of Germans (and Russians, for that matter), and not the “lesser” and 
“incapable” other peoples that happen to live in-between. In his memorandum 
addressed to Lloyd George on 22 May 1919, Smuts actually reiterated some of the 
Balfour memo’s arguments: “The new Poland will include […] territories which 
have for very long periods been part of Germany (or Russia). It is reasonably certain 
that both Germany and Russia will again be great Powers, and that, sandwiched 
between them, the new Poland could only be a success with their good will. How, 
under these circumstances, can we expect Poland to be other than a failure, if 
she had that ruling and administrative capacity which history has proved she has 
not? […] I think we are building a house of sand”.8 The South African statesman 
who had never been to Poland, but sympathized with the fate of downtrodden 
Germany, had no misgivings presenting such a straightforward opinion on Poles 
in general: “Kaffirs, that’s what they are!”.9 In his opinion, “civilized” Germans 
were the only natural partners to recreate a civilized order in Eastern Europe, 
and not those natural born slaves, or half-children at best, who lived to the east 
and south of them. 
On the day he received Smuts’ letter of protest Lloyd George read it aloud 
to President Wilson and Georges Clemenceau it. Even though the British prime 
minister objected at first10 to the suggestions of the South African, he actually 
followed his reasoning. Not in the racist opinions on Poles perhaps, neither in 
Smuts’ philo-Germanic attitude, typical for a majority of the imperial educated 
class in its reverence for German achievements in the arts and sciences (combined 
with a more or less complete ignorance of other people living between the Oder, 
the Dnieper and the Danube). No, just like his foreign secretary Arthur Balfour, the 
Prime Minister did not want to fix his mind “on the lamentations of the Germans 
8  J. Smuts, “Germany’s Eastern Frontier” [addressed to Lloyd George, 22 May 1919], in: Selection 
from the Smuts Papers, vol. 4: November 1918–August 1919, eds. W.K. Hancock, J. van der Poel, 
Cambridge University Press, 1966, pp. 185–186.
9  Smuts said this in his conversation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain, 
in July 1919, see: The Austen Chamberlain Diary Letters. The Correspondence of Sir Austen Cham-
berlain with his Sisters Hilda and Ida, 1916–1937, ed. R.C. Self, Cambridge, 1995, p. 116.
10  See Lloyd George’s letter to Smuts, 3 June 1919, in: Selection from the Smuts Papers, vol. 4, 
pp. 217–218.
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and their misfortunes”. He was a more pragmatic carrier of this first appeasement, 
as Antony Lentin calls the phenomenon of a pro-German revisionism among 
British (and American) political elites during the peace conference in Paris.11 
Lloyd George believed in order based on an agreement with its responsible 
guardians: that is to say with traditional imperial partners, not just France and Italy, 
but Germany and Russia as well – in their “natural” sphere of responsibility in 
Eastern Europe. Unlike the conservative Balfour, the liberal-minded Lloyd George 
was ready to accept even the new (“Red”) Russia in this traditional, geopolitical 
role. He had already tried to enter a political dialogue with the Bolsheviks at the 
beginning of 1919 – with his so called “Prinkipo Islands” conference initiative.12 
Then he had to allow his government’s conservative majority (backed by France) to 
try a more interventionist policy, but finally, at the end of 1919 and the collapse of 
the main anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia, he forced his colleagues in the Cabinet to 
accept the idea of “peace through trade”. It aimed at the peace with Bolshevik Russia 
based on economic reasons and faith in progress and stability. The fundamentals 
of these more optimistic ideas were exactly the same as in the more melancholic 
view of Balfour: Russia (any Russia, now the “Red” one) and Germany are the most 
important, or rather the only important partners for the economic renewal of the 
Continent and peace. Lloyd George intended to “fight anarchy with abundance”.13 
He wanted to appease Germany – with his decision, imposed in Versailles, of 
denying Danzig to Poland, and leaving the question of Silesia open to the future 
decision of plebiscites – in order to bring her delegation to London, firstly for 
economic talks, then for political talks. When the Polish foreign minister, Stanisław 
Patek, presented on 26 January 1920 his government’s concerns with the possi-
bility of a Bolshevik offensive towards the German centre of Europe overrunning 
Poland and other “minor” countries on the way, Lloyd George answered in a very 
characteristic manner. He tried to persuade Patek, as well as his conservative 
colleagues in the Cabinet “that there were not sufficient foodstuffs or raw materials 
in Poland, Hungary, or Germany to attract an invasion by the Red Army”. All these 
countries, he said, “could offer nothing to the Bolshevik armies but famine and 
typhus”.14 This is revealing both in its stress on economics as the only important 
lever in political developments (combined with a complete disregard for ideology 
11  A. Lentin, Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: From Versailles to Hitler, 1919–1940, New York, 
2001, pp. 67–88.
12  See, for example, J.M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace, Princeton (NJ), 
1966, pp. 82–129; R. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921, vol. 2: Britain and the Russian 
Civil War, Princeton (NJ), 1968; R.K. Debo, Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of 
Soviet Russia, 1918–1921, Montreal and Kingston, 1992, pp. 36–39.
13  See: M.G. Fry, And Fortune Fled. David Lloyd George, the First Democratic Statesman, 1916–1922, 
New York, pp. 418–423. 
14  Quoted after Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921, vol. 3: The Anglo-Soviet 
Accord, Princeton (NJ), 1972, p. 25.
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and geopolitics), and in its attitude towards all countries between Russia and 
Germany. These countries have nothing to offer – not just to the Bolsheviks, but 
(even more so) – to the Western powers, to the British position and prosperity. 
They were dispensable, unlike Russia, even Bolshevik Russia, which supposedly 
had great deposits of grain, so desperately needed in the rest of Europe.15 
I will not dwell here on Lloyd George’s policy towards Poland and Bolshevik 
Russia in 1920, as I have just published an extensive book on this subject.16 I only 
want to stress that both Balfour in his conservative-geopolitical way, and Lloyd 
George in his liberal-economic perspective saw Eastern Europe on their mental 
maps exactly as a borderland (a “thin” one, not to provoke the anger of its more 
powerful and “meaningful” neighbours) between Germany and Russia. They both 
believed in an order which should be based on these two empires, at least in Eastern 
Europe, beyond the pale of British imperial interests. 
The Labour Party, backed by the trade union movement, a very active and 
vociferous minority power in British politics after the December 1918 elections, 
presented another set of arguments for leaving Eastern Europe to Russia rather 
than to bothering with “lesser” nations inhabiting those “far-away countries”. They 
sympathized with the cause of the Revolution, and felt the cause of social progress 
was represented by the Bolsheviks rather than by any of their enemies in Eastern 
Europe – the Russian “Whites” or national “bourgeois” governments created from 
the ruins of the Romanovs’ empire. “Poland had sinned against humanity’s best 
hope” is how the Daily Herald summed up this attitude. The newspaper would 
express the voice of the left-wing opposition (so called Councils of Action) to any 
British help given to Poland after it was invaded by the Red Army in July and 
August 1920. Poland, fighting with Bolshevik Russia, would be seen not as the 
weaker state defending its independence against its former imperial overlords, 
but as a reactionary force which tried to stop the inevitable development of the 
first socialist state in the world. The Labour Party used exactly the same words as 
the Herald to describe their political stand at the moment when the Red Army 
was at the gates of Warsaw, at the very centre of ethnographic Poland. To help 
“reactionary” Poland at such a moment, it declared, would have been be “an 
intolerable crime against humanity”.17 
15  This assumption, totally absurd, given the unprecedented famine in Russia under the Bolsheviks 
at that particular moment, was infused by the chief economic advisor to Lloyd George, Edward 
F. Wise, in his memorandum: Economic Aspects of British Policy Concerning Russia (from Jan-
uary 1920), see Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921, vol. 3, pp. 14–18.
16  A. Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu. 1920: zapomniany appeasement, Kraków, 2015.
17  E.M. Carroll, Soviet Communism and Western Opinion 1919–1921, Chapel Hill (NC), 1965, 
pp. 167–170; S. White, “Labour’s Council of Action 1920”, Journal of Contemporary History, 9, 
1974, pp. 99–122 (quotation at p. 102); P. White, Iron Curtain. From Stage to Cold War, Oxford, 
2007, pp. 137–139; N. Davies, White Eagle, Red Star. The Polish-Soviet War, 1919–1920, London, 
1983, pp. 177–181.
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I do not intend to present here details of the “Hands off Russia!” agitation 
and the subsequent pro-Bolshevik strikes led by the Council of Action and the 
demonstrations throughout England in the summer of 1920. I just want to add 
one general remark: the British left wing paradoxically shared the Order-Chaos 
model of interpreting geopolitical shifts in Eastern Europe, at least after the Russian 
revolutions of 1917. Russia represented the force of Order (however brutal it might 
be): the new Order, or – to put it simply – the New World. Minor states on its 
western borderlands, on the way to “Europe” (which for the British left, just like 
for the British conservatives or liberals, ended in the East on the imagined borders 
of Germany), belonged to the forces of the Old, the forces of Chaos. They did not 
represent any interesting social experiment worthy of compassion. New humanity 
had new hope in Russia, and whoever stopped this hope to change the grim post-
war continent into a land of a socialist promise was a “sinner”. The leader of the 
Council of Action, Ernest Bevin, could only agree with this part of the Balfour 
statement: “The more Russia is made a European rather than an Asiatic Power, 
the better for everybody”.18 The “big picture”, the “great vision” – also for those 
believing in progress – tended to obscure lesser “dots” that did not fit in, and had 
just found, or were still fighting, to their place on the political map of Europe. 
Winston Churchill, War Secretary, saw it otherwise. His anti-Bolshevik attitude 
as well as his futile efforts to help the “Whites” to win the Russian Civil War are 
analysed in so many books and articles that I do not need to dwell upon this subject. 
I would rather like to note that his perception of Eastern Europe was actually the 
opposite of that of the leftist sympathizers of the Bolsheviks. Churchill saw Russia 
and Eastern Europe as the battlefront between Order and Chaos, too. The difference 
was that the Bolsheviks were to him the epitome of universal Chaos, and anything 
opposing them was identified as an ally of Order. He believed that the main forces 
deciding the outcome of this dramatic confrontation were Russia and Germany. 
In his memorandum of 19 September 1919, he warned dramatically about the 
possibility of their collaboration, either in a combination of “Red” Russia with 
“Red” Germany, or “Black” (reactionary, monarchist) Russia with “Black” Germany, 
or even “Red” Russia with “Black” (reactionary and revanchist) Germany. Such 
a collaboration could be joined by Japan, and thereby outweigh Britain, France, and 
the United States. Churchill used this warning as an argument to help the “White” 
Russian forces under Denikin, and was ready to appeal to his own government 
to use Germany against Russia, if necessary. What is especially interesting to us 
here is that he began to acknowledge the fact that there were also other players 
in this vital, Eastern European showdown. He saw them as minor players, but 
players nonetheless: Poland, three new Baltic republics, and even “feeble Ukrainian 
forces under Petlyura”. They all were able to influence the outcome of the decisive 
18  See L.J. MacFarlane, “Hands Off Russia: British Labour and the Russo-Polish War, 1920”, Past 
& Present, 38, 1967, pp. 126–152; Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada, pp. 355–376. 
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confrontation. Churchill drew a conclusion form this observation: these minor 
players should be acknowledged in London, and taken into strategic consideration. 
For Ukraine, he had “the conception of a Russia consisting of a number of 
autonomous States, grouped together on a federal basis into a Russian union”. Such 
a union, he felt, “is one within which all legitimate aspirations may be comprised. 
The new Russian state, reformed along these lines, would be less a menace to the 
future peace of the world than the vast centralized empire of Czarism”.19 For 
the  Baltic states, Churchill wanted their full recognition by the Allies in return 
for an undertaking by them to attack the Bolsheviks (to help the “Whites”). Lloyd 
George responded to these proposals in a very characteristic way: “Whether the 
Bolsheviks or the anti-Bolsheviks get the upper hand, they would not recognize the 
independence of these [Baltic] States as it would involve the permanent exclusion of 
Russia from the Baltic. Would you be prepared to make war with an Anti-Bolshevik 
regime if they attempted to reconquer these States and to secure the old Russian 
ports of Riga and Reval?”.20 The Prime Minister did not even bother to comment 
on Ukraine, as he considered it to be evidently a Russian internal matter. We have 
to stress it again: for Lloyd George Russia, any Russia, was the natural, and only 
important partner for London to keep order in Eastern Europe. That is why he 
wanted to satisfy Russian demands in the region as fully as possible – just to the 
borders of Germany, another pillar of European order. For Churchill, Bolshevik 
Russia was not such a partner – and that is why he was ready to undermine her 
with “minor forces” in Eastern Europe. And he had one potential ally in the 
government: the new Foreign Secretary (acting since January 1919, and officially 
since October of that year), George Nathaniel Curzon.
Lord Curzon was personally very much interested in Russia, but from a very 
particular perspective. As a young aristocrat he had been a successful explorer of 
the geopolitical shift between the Russian and British Empires. He understood 
Russia from the perspective of the Great Game of empires in Asia, from Afghanistan 
and Persia – studied by him as outposts of British interests threatened by the 
Romanovs’ imperial designs. For him Russia – any Russia – was the enemy, but 
his conservatism made compromises with Red Russia even harder to swallow. Even 
though he failed to assert himself as the principal architect of British foreign policy, 
being dominated (like everyone else in the Cabinet) by Lloyd George, Curzon 
tried to influence the “Russian” policy of his government towards a “realistic” 
Friend–Foe model, based on an assessment of the conflicting interests of two rival 
empires. He intended to push back Russia from the Caucasus (Azerbaijan and 
Georgia) and the Caspian Sea, to diminish the Russian imperial threat which he 
19  W. Churchill, “Russian Policy”, 19 September 1919, Parliamentary Archives (London), Lloyd 
George Papers – LG/F/202/10-11. 
20  Lloyd George to Churchill, 22 September 1919, quoted after: M. Gilbert, World In Torment: 
Winston S. Churchill 1917–1922, London, 1990 (1st ed. 1975), p. 333.
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considered most important to British imperial power in Asia.21 From that particular 
perspective Curzon was ready to take the new states organized on the ruins of 
the former Romanov Empire as useful tools in the British imperial game against 
its strategic foe. Because they were placed in the area he believed counted in that 
strategic game, he believed they should be taken into consideration by London 
statesmen, and not just left for Russia and Germany. 
It was Curzon who introduced to the government probably the single most 
interesting document confirming such an unusual perspective on Eastern Europe. 
He did so exactly at the moment he became the official head of the Foreign Office. 
The document passed unnoticed by students of British foreign policy of the time, 
but it is really worth noting here. Dated 3 October 1919, it was introduced by 
Curzon as a proposed answer to the question raised by the Prime Minister “at 
a recent meeting of the War Cabinet”. The question was “whether British interests 
in particular and the peace of the world in general would be better served by 
a revived and united Russia, or by the reverse”. The answer was prepared, as Curzon 
stated, “by an able member of the Foreign Office staff”, most likely John Duncan 
Gregory.22 This secret, nine-page memorandum, circulated among the members 
of the Cabinet, began with a suggestion that had the “old” Russia (represented by 
“Sazonoffs” and “Denikins”) been re-established, that would have rather provoked 
further conflicts than brought stability. In that case there would be no independence 
for Finland, no question of making any concessions to the Baltic States, which 
would gain autonomy at best, controversy with Poland, and, finally, “the ambitions 
[of Russia] and the competition of the latter in the Caucasus and in Persia will 
be revived”. All that would have led to another geopolitical upheaval in Eastern 
Europe and made the spectre of Russo-German collaboration materialize again, 
resulting in “the massacre of the smaller States”. This would, stressed the author, 
be akin to the eighteenth-century collaboration of Russia and Germany. Besides, 
Russia “run on old lines” would have carried the seeds of another revolution. 
The memorandum acknowledged the fact that a weak Russia also offered 
possible dangers to be taken into strategic account: such as “every sort of political 
and commercial penetration from Germany in the West and from Japan in the 
East”, and anarchy in Central and Western Asia, which would bring the whole 
burden of maintaining order in the region on the British Empire. The author 
suggests that the answer to what sort of Russia would be best for the interest of the 
21  See D. Gilmour, Curzon: Imperial Statesman, New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1994; 
G.H.  Bennett, British Foreign Policy During the Curzon Period, 1919–1924, New York, 1995, 
pp. 41–75; M. Hughes, British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 1919–1939, New York, 
2006, pp. 17–32; S. Kelly, “How Far the West?: Lord Curzon’s Transcaucastian (Mis)Adventure 
and the Defence of British India, 1918–23”, International History Review, 35, 2013, pp. 274–293.
22  “Secret. Printed for the War Cabinet”, 3 October 1919, Parliamentary Archives (London), Lloyd 
George Papers – LG/F/202/1/12. See also J.D. Gregory, On the Edge of Diplomacy: Rambles and 
Reflections, 1902–1928, London, 1929; Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada, pp. 297–302.
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United Kingdom was to be found in the region of the former Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth: “Poland is the pivot on which our Eastern European policy 
ought to turn”.23 
A political-strategic collaboration between Poland, the three new Baltic States 
(Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), and Finland would have been crucial. Churchill 
advanced the concept of using these countries as bases for a concerted anti-Bol-
shevik action whose goal was the restoration of “White” Russia. The author of the 
memorandum questioned the wisdom of this politics: “it is very doubtful whether 
Poland would consider it to her interest to put a forcible end to the Bolshevik 
regime since she would have little choice but to hand over a liberated Russia to 
the tender mercies of Denikin, with untoward consequences to herself”. The actual 
policy pursued by the British government as whole, that is to leave Eastern Europe 
to work out its own salvation, would lead to a series of separate peace treaties 
between Poland, the Baltic States and other “Border States” (as the new states 
between Russia and Germany were called in Paris in 1919) and Bolshevik Russia. 
Such peace treaties would have only strengthened the Bolsheviks and given no 
permanent stability to the Border States, opening their societies to the influences 
of Soviet propaganda and further revolution. So neither of these options was 
advocated in the memorandum. Instead, it presented a third option. This was based 
on the assumption that collaboration between the “non-Bolshevist Russians” and 
the “Border States”, with Poland as the key among them, was possible and should 
be encouraged by the British government. Such collaboration would have not been 
aimed at restoration of the one and indivisible Russian Empire (so vitally dangerous 
to the new border states), but would have been based on reality of this choice: 
“a future Russia dependent on the goodwill of even its smallest neighbours or no 
future Russia at all”. The author added a special argument to his suggestion that 
the British government should have really changed his priorities in Eastern Europe: 
“Poland and Finland are Western countries with all the traditions and education 
of European civilization […] The lesser Border States are equally Western. But the 
Russians, Bolsheviks and non-Bolsheviks alike, are manifesting every day more 
the characteristics of unstable orientalism, and have still to prove that, without the 
German stuffing of centuries they are capable at self-government”.24
As a possible solution to the Russian question the memorandum proposed 
“the confederation idea”, which meant that “we should progressively recognize 
the virtual independence or provisional independence, or extreme autonomy of 
self-governing communities in Siberia, the Ukraine, White Russia, and anywhere 
else where Bolsheviks may recede.” Developing this unique perspective, the 
23  This and other quotations in the paragraphs above are from the untitled memorandum circulated 
by Curzon: “Secret. Printed for the War Cabinet”, 3 October, 1919, Parliamentary Archives 
(London), Lloyd George Papers – LG/F/202/1/12.
24  Ibid., p. 6.
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memorandum’s author reflected upon Ukraine and Belarus (“White Russia”) as 
“candidates” for independence. Ukraine was in her relation to Russia compared to 
the relation between Austria and Germany. However it could be considered “an 
artificial state”, the author stated boldly that “there would be no violent infraction 
of modern political principles in creating it”, and added that it could survive either 
in a federation or in an alliance with Poland. Even though “White Russia” had 
expressed “even less” separatist tendencies than Ukraine, it could also form an 
independent state. Siberia, due to its geographical position and economic resources 
was considered to be “more naturally formed as a separate state”.
After presenting this scenario of actual dismemberment of the Russian Empire, 
the “able member of the Foreign Office staff”, in the words of Lord Curzon, 
supported it with his opinion that “in Russia there is no such thing as patriotism in 
the accepted Western sense of the word” and that even the “old Orthodox religion” 
would not be strong enough to hold the disintegrating body of the empire together. 
The author, therefore, persuasively presented the above scenario as possible. But was 
it “to our interest”? The question posed in the memorandum is introduced with two 
assumptions. Firstly, the necessity of preventing Russia from becoming a German 
colony or of allowing “a German-Japanese-Russian combination” that would push 
the British Empire out of Eurasia from coalescing; and secondly, the necessity “to 
secure our Eastern frontiers against anarchy”. The best means to exclude the first 
danger was to strengthen Poland (as a barrier between German influences and 
Russia), possibly confederated with Lithuania and even with Ukraine. The problem 
of anarchy would not be solved by the reestablishment of the Russian Empire: 
“Centralisation of Government in a country is always dangerous to its neighbours, 
and Russia cannot get on without a dictatorship”. A system of separate states could 
be fragile and insufficient to keep out the danger of anarchy in Eastern Europe. 
But once it was backed by Western industrial and political influence – it could 
work. The author sums up his considerations clearly: 
We have to make up our minds to a new course of action. It is then that the question of 
embarking on a real political stake in Poland and the border states comes up for consid-
eration. The alternatives are either to make peace with the Bolsheviks, to retire definitely 
from the fray, or to attempt a combination of Poland and the border states. The first is 
problematical, if not a definite surrender to an enemy, probably greater than Prussianism, 
and the second is to abandon the whole of Eastern Europe to Germany. The third, therefore, 
is the only one that offers any chance of success. But it should clearly carry with it our 
right to restrain the States with whom we act from encroaching beyond their due limits 
and to direct them to relations with a reconstructed Russia.25 
The actual course taken by the British government at the end of 1919 would be 
a combination of the first (peace and even a geo-economic accord with Bolshevik 
25  Ibid., p. 8.
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Russia – the true goal of Lloyd George) and the second options (in case the first 
one was unsuccessful). The third option, and the only one which took the strategic 
meaning of the “border states” seriously, was very quickly rejected. The “Whites” 
lost their chance in the Russian Civil war, if they ever had one. The British Cabinet 
decided on 29 January 1920, that “the border states” surrounding Russia must 
themselves take the full responsibility for deciding between peace and war. This 
actually meant full responsibility for deciding between capitulation and defence in 
case of a Bolshevik offensive – and no engagement from London in either case.26 
The decision of the Cabinet was taken exactly after hearing the most outspoken 
proponent of the ideas presented four months earlier in the memorandum of 
3 October. This rare occasion of explaining his views to members of the government 
was given on 29 January 1920 to no one else but Sir Halford Mackinder. The father 
of geopolitics, the author of the most famous treatise on the subject – Democratic 
Ideals and Reality, published in 1919 with the (futile) intention to inspire statesmen 
in Versailles – engaged himself in an effort to bring the idea of forming a stable 
coalition of “Border States” into reality.27 He accepted the mission offered to him 
by Lord Curzon on 23 October 1919 to be a special envoy to General Denikin, 
leader of the anti-Bolshevik army in South Russia, to Poland, and to other “Border 
States” (Romania and Bulgaria). The goal of the mission was to try to organize an 
effective military and political alliance between the last forces of anti-Bolshevik 
Russia and these states in order to tame the imperial ambitions of the Bolsheviks 
and to create a new geopolitical system of stability in the region and in all Europe. 
The Oxford geographer (since 1910 a Conservative and Unionist Member of 
Parliament), spent several exciting weeks on his Eastern European tour between 
early December 1919 and mid-January 1920. He visited the Polish Head of State, 
Józef Piłsudski in Warsaw, where he found full support for his mission. Then 
he moved to Bucharest and Sofia, where he met with less success. Finally he 
met General Denikin, already beaten by the Bolsheviks and due to this desperate 
position more inclined to the idea of strategic cooperation with Poland, the new 
Caucasus border states, and other “lesser neighbours” of Russia. When Mackinder 
came back to London, he was determined to persuade his government to adopt 
the new policy in Eastern Europe: to “range up all the anti-Bolshevist States, from 
Finland to the Caucasus” and to give them “a certain amount” of political and 
military support. Mackinder’s position was concluded for the Cabinet meeting on 
January 29 with the following opinion: “It was necessary to adopt the whole policy 
or to do nothing. The alternative was to see the Bolsheviks come down to the 
26  See The Churchill Documents, ed. M. Gilbert, vol. 9: Disruption and Chaos, July 1919 – March 
1921, Hillsdale (MI), 1977, p. 1020 (Cabinet minutes, 29 January 1920); Gilbert, World in Tor-
ment, pp. 320–64; Fry, And Fortune Fled, pp. 413–418; Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, vol. 2, 
pp. 294–304.
27  See B. Blouet, Halford Mackinder: A Biography, Austin (TX), 1987; G. Kearns, Geopolitics and 
Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder, Oxford, 2009.
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Black Sea, to the Crimea and to Odessa, which would be a complete moral victory 
for them. It would be necessary to drive his policy to extremes. Once an alliance 
such as he contemplated had been created, and the morale of the anti-Bolshevist 
States had been re-established, we should be in a much better position to obtain 
a Peace with a Soviet Russia which was not triumphant”.28
The mission itself is not the focus of our interest.29 What is interesting here is 
a geopolitical perspective offered by Halford Mackinder not just in his – unsuccess-
ful – attempt at persuasion addressed to the Cabinet at the end of January 1920, 
but also earlier, and in a more developed way, in his book. Democratic Ideals and 
Reality was actually the most sophisticated proposal of changes in British (and, 
one can say more generally: Western) perspectives on Eastern Europe. Probably it 
is this book which had inspired the way of thinking and preparing arguments in 
the anonymous memorandum circulated by Curzon in early October 1919. It was 
not effective enough to change the perceptions of such people as Arthur Balfour 
or David Lloyd George, but it left its political testament which influences further 
reflections. So, to conclude this exploration of the British imperial imagination 
and the place Eastern Europe occupied in its different variants during and after the 
Great War, I would like to present the arguments introduced by Halford Mackinder. 
Mackinder, born in 1861 (two years older than Lloyd George, and two 
years younger than Curzon), educated at Oxford and appointed the first Reader 
in Geography there in 1887, one of the founders and the first director of the 
London School of Economics, pronounced his main geopolitical ideas in 1904. On 
25 January 25 year he gave a lecture on “The geographical pivot of history” at the 
Royal Geographical Society. He proposed a formula of “geographical causation in 
universal history”. After 400 years of the Columban epoch, geographical exploration 
was over and the world for the first time formed a “closed political system”. This 
was the warning he addressed towards the British attitude of splendid isolation. 
Isolation was not possible any more. “Every explosion of social forces, instead of 
being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, 
will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the 
political and economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence”.30 
Mackinder’s diagnosis signified that there would be no “faraway countries of which 
28  “Notes of points, supplementary to his memorandum of January 21, 1920, made by Sir H.J. Mack-
inder in reply to questions put to him at the Cabinet Meeting held on Thursday, January 29, 
1920, at 11–30 a.m.”, National Archives (Kew), Foreign Office 800/251 (“Private Papers of Sir 
H.J. Mackinder, Relating to His Mission to South Russia, October 1919 to February 1920”), p. 7.
29  For more details of the mission see Documents on British Foreign Policy, first series, vol. 3, 
eds. E.L. Woodward, R. Butler, London, 1949, pp. 672–78 (Curzon’s instruction for Mackinder, 
2 December 1919), pp. 768–86 (Mackinder’s report), pp. 792–93 (Denikin’s letter to Mackinder, 
14 January 1920); see also A. Nowak, Polska i trzy Rosje. Studium polityki wschodniej Józefa 
Piłsudskiego (do kwietnia 1920 roku), 3rd ed., Kraków, 2015, pp. 389–410. 
30  H.J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, Geographical Journal, 23, April 1904,  4, 
p. 421.
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we know nothing” (as Neville Chamberlain would describe Czechoslovakia at the 
time of the Munich conference thirty-four years later). A responsible statesman 
should look around the globe in this new situation and find the places of potential 
crisis as well as those points on the map that would be crucial to any serious 
effort to avert crises. 
The most important of these places was pointed out by Mackinder himself. He 
spotted it as a consequence of his geohistorical observation that Asia and Europe 
actually form one great continent, and “European civilization is, in a very real sense, 
the outcome of the secular struggle against Asiatic invasion”. The struggle is not 
over. Russia has managed through her centuries-long expansion to occupy the most 
important strategic position on this vast Euro-Asian continent, the heart-land, as 
Mackinder called it for the first time. “To east, south, and west of this heart-land 
are marginal regions, ranged in a vast crescent, accessible to shipmen”.31 The British 
Empire took control over the key positions of this crescent. This enabled London 
to contain the danger of the “heart-land” empire’s domination over the whole 
of Eurasia. Land power versus sea power, camel and horse versus naval vessels, 
now – the Trans-Siberian railway versus the Suez Canal. Such was the epitome of 
the Friend-Foe model comprised in the first sketch of Mackinder’s geopolitics. He 
saw Russia as the major threat, as well as a possibility of Russian-German alliance. 
Russia, through her further expansion “over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia”, 
especially if allied with Germany, would be able to overset the balance of power 
in favour of herself – “and the empire of the world would then be in sight”.32
Mackinder did not see any role for the Eastern European prey of Russian imperial 
expansion in his 1904 geopolitical “manifesto”, though he enumerated them in a his-
torical overview: from Finland, through the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 
all the way to Turkey. He tried to focus the attention of his listeners on the necessity 
of collaboration between other crescent (sea) powers  – France and Italy – with 
two Anglo-Saxon empires. To keep the Eurasiatic crescent – from Sweden to the 
Mediterranean, Egypt, Turkey, Persia, India, up to Korea – out of future Russian 
(or Russian-German) incursions: this was his geostrategic “recipe” of 1904.33
But once he identified geographically the enemy (or even a more deadly 
combination of two enemies), he would be able to develop his “recipe”, adding 
important new ingredients to it. The ingredients – that is potential friends against 
enemies – were to be found, re-created, and strengthened on the geopolitical 
shift in Eastern Europe. We can trace the beginnings of Mackinder’s interest in 
the region to 1905, when he published the English translation of Joseph Partsch’s 
31  For the quotations: ibid., pp. 422 and 431. 
32  Ibid., p. 436.
33  For contemporary interpretations of this path-breaking text and its immediate political contexts, 
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treatise on Central Europe. It presented – for the first time so distinctly – a danger 
of German Mitteleuropa: a not so distant future dream of Friedrich Naumann 
and the brief reality of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. During the Great War, the 
British geographer turned back-bench MP and political commentator deepened 
his interest in nationalities of the region between Russia and Germany. He tried 
to find resources there to counter the German Mitteleuropa project, and – at 
the same time – not to open the region to further Russian expansion. He was 
even elected as a delegate of the Serbian Society to the Congress of Oppressed 
Nationalities in Rome of 1918.34 
Immediately after the war he decided to voice his concerns in Parliament 
for the benefit of the authors of the new, post-war order. He wanted to warn 
democracies that if they intended to realize their ideal of the League of Nations 
they had to “recognise these geographical realities” that lend themselves to the 
growth of empires, and in the end of a single world empire. “Can we establish such 
a world power as shall suffice to keep the law between great and small states, and 
yet shall not grow into a world tyranny? There are two roads to such a tyranny, 
the one the conquest of all other nations by one nation, the other the perversion 
of the very international power itself which may be set up to coerce the lawless 
nation”.35 How to avoid both pitfalls? “What degree of international reconstruction 
is necessary if the world is long to remain a safe place for democracies. […] Shall 
we succeed in soberly marrying our new idealism to reality?”.36 
The answer given by Mackinder extolled the meaning of the geographical 
divides he had spotted already in his “pivot” article. Germany and Russia would 
not become instantly or even quickly pillars of a democratic world order. They are 
too much “tempted” by their history and geography to try again to rule over the 
continent – not just Europe, but “the joint continent of Europe, Asia, and Africa”, 
the whole “World-Island”, as he called it for the first time in the book. Russia 
occupies the Heartland, Germany is in the centre of Europe. The key region is the 
one between them: it decides who can aspire to the domination of the World-Island. 
The region is Eastern Europe. Here Mackinder formulated his famous saying: “Who 
rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands 
the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the World”.37 
34  See Mackinder’s articles published at this time: “Adriatic Question”, Glasgow Herald, 3 Decem-
ber 1917; “The New Map of Europe”, Glasgow Herald, 8 May 1918; “Rome Conference”, Glasgow 
Herald, 20 May 1918; “End of Empire: The Break-up of Austria-Hungary”, Glasgow Herald, 
31  October 1918. For more details of Mackinder’s developing interest in Eastern European 
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and Eastern Europe, 1919–1920”, available at https://www.academia.edu/4708068/Geopolitics_
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8 January 2016).
35  H.J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, London, 1919, p. 5.
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Victorious Western democracies should concentrate their efforts on recon-
structing the international order and not just on the idealistic premises of the 
League of Nations, nor on futile hopes of bringing Russia or Germany into the 
post-war order based only on their goodwill or their interests. It was necessary 
to make these two vanquished powers’ dreams of imperial revenge unrealizable. 
“The condition of stability in the territorial rearrangement of East Europe is that 
the division should be into three and not into two state-systems. It is a vital 
necessity that there should be a tier of independent states between Germany and 
Russia”.38 Mackinder enumerates seven non-German peoples between the Baltic 
and the Mediterranean, “each on the scale of a European State of the second rank”: 
the Poles, the Bohemians (Czechs and Slovaks), the Hungarians, the South Slavs 
(Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes), the Rumanians, the Bulgarians, and the Greeks. 
On the map drawn on the following page (207) he added – somehow vaguely – 
two Baltic states: Lithuania and Estonia (Latvia disappeared mysteriously between 
them). Poland exists on this map within borders close to the final demarcation of 
the Riga treaty from 1921. 
Mackinder stressed the importance of Poland as the most numerous among 
these peoples, and the most strategic in its position. It was the buffer between 
Germany and Russia that must be completed – he insisted. The geographer pro-
posed even a specific solution to the key territorial problem arising from the Polish 
accession to the Baltic, which left East Prussia detached from the rest of Germany 
and made it a sore point on the new map of Eastern Europe. Mackinder suggested 
simply “an exchange of peoples” between Prussia and – as he randomly chose – the 
westernmost Polish province of Posen (the official Prussian-German name for the 
province centred on the city of Poznań in historic Greater Poland – Wielkopolska). 
He concluded his geopolitical advice to the Western statesmen in Paris with the 
following passage: 
The most important point of strategical significance in regard to these Middle States of 
East Europe is that the most civilized of them, Poland and Bohemia, lie in the North, 
in the position most exposed to Prussian aggression. Securely independent the Polish 
and Bohemian nations cannot be unless as the apex of a broad wedge of independence, 
extending from the Adriatic and Black Seas to the Baltic; but seven independent States, 
with a total of more than sixty million people, traversed by railways linking them securely 
with one another, and having access through the Adriatic, Black, and Baltic Seas with the 
Ocean, will together effectively balance the Germans of Prussia and Austria, and nothing 
less will suffice for that purpose.39 
Nothing less, but something more would have been even more desirable. 
Mackinder suggested that both Russia and Prussia (both blocked by the solid 
38  Ibid., p. 205.
39  Ibid., p. 215.
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“middle tier” in their possibilities to develop imperialistic plans) would themselves 
disintegrate into a number of states “in some sort of loose federation”.40 The 
anonymous author from the Foreign Office, writing his memorandum for Curzon 
a few months later, would feel free to expand exactly on this subject, adding new 
possible candidates for “the Middle Tier”: all three Baltic States, but also Ukraine 
and “White Russia” (meaning Belarus). And Mackinder himself tried, as we have 
seen, to realize this project in his mission to Piłsudski and Denikin. And he failed. 
Such a geopolitical reorganization of Eastern Europe as he promoted as nec-
essary to complement the organization of the League of Nations, adding balance 
to ideals,41 would not happen. Instead, a logic of appeasement would triumph. 
That logic was popular, because it offered a short-cut way for anti-war sentiments 
which dominated, quite naturally, in British society after the First World War. It 
was easier and less risky in terms of day-to-day politics to believe that the defeated 
powers that had been “responsible” for order in Eastern Europe would be satisfied 
enough to keep this order again, and not to engage British (or Western in general) 
imagination and real forces in forming a new order with new, unknown partners 
from the Eastern European “middle tier”. As Philip Kerr, the private secretary and 
the real top-advisor to Lloyd George, wrote to his prime minister in September 
1920: “I am very much afraid that the European situation is now unmanagea-
ble […]. Eastern Europe is already out of control […]. On the other hand the 
burden on Great Britain is now so great, in Ireland, in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, 
in India, and in the Labour world at home, that no government can give the 
time necessary to the management of European affairs. […] You should make it 
clear to France and to Italy that Great Britain is not going to take on the role of 
Atlas”.42 That role was to be given – as regards the Eastern European part of the 
sky – to Germany and to Russia, again. The rest was considered chaos. And so it 
would remain.
The sky fell in 1939. 
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